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volitionist line: see such people as misdescribing their own experience or see 
their "conversion" as somehow substandard. Either alternative might give one 
pause; however, one can hypothesize about Kierkegaardian reasons for such 
a claim. For example, one could doubt that 'will power' is ever enough to 
engage decisively one's being, arguing that weighing and making a deliberate 
choice among equally real options would at best bring one to Christendom, 
not to Christianity. Or, one might apply Ferreira's very interesting suggestions 
about the role of the understanding and critical appraisal in Kierkegaardian 
faith (pp. 129-144) by arguing that volitionist conversion would be irrational 
in ways that Kierkegaardian conversion would not. A filling out and evalu-
ation of such lines of argument would be a worthwhile extension of Ferreira's 
project. 
An alternative would be to take the volitionist and the Kierkegaardian to 
be describing two different, but equally valid, modes of conversion (a position 
one might call weak Kierkegaardianism or weak volitionism, depending on 
one's initial loyalties). After all, God's house has many mansions and the 
Spirit "blows where it wills." Perhaps there are leaps and leaps. It may be 
that many more conversions are like Dillard's breathtaking description of 
Hugh's plunge into a Puget Sound pond than like the more prosaic decision 
to jump from the side of a well-illumined swimming pool; we would have 
to, as Wittgenstein so often recommends, look and see. But, within the Chris-
tian tradition, we should also humbly keep in mind that we see ourselves as 
well as others "through a glass darkly." 
NOTE 
1. Annie Dillard, The Living (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 397. 
An Apology for Apologetics, by Paul J. Griffiths. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1991. Pp. xii and 113. $16.95 (paper). 
JAMES WETZEL, Colgate University. 
This is a polemical book, written to challenge conventional academic wisdom 
on the value of religious apologetics. Griffiths would like the university to 
remain open to those who would, as scholars, advocate the truth of a particu-
lar tradition. His proposal is striking, to put it mildly. Religious advocacy and 
scholarly objectivity have not commonly been thought compatible. In the 
Western academy, a murky religious pluralism has been the order of the day. 
Departments of religion encourage the comparative study of religion, as long 
as that remains a descriptive task, but they generally discourage comparative 
evaluation. In part this is because individual religious traditions are demand-
ing objects of study, and very few of us are in a position to make substantive 
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evaluations across traditions. The need for circumspection in the face of 
religious complexity raises no objection to evaluation in principle, however, 
and I suspect that Griffiths, who is well acquainted with the intricacies of 
Theravada Buddhism, would be the last to claim that evaluation across tra-
ditions is an easy task. The more controversial motive of comparative relig-
ious study has been the assumption, sometimes implicit but often explicit, 
that all religious traditions are equally worthy of study because no one relig-
ion is any closer to the truth than another. To suppose otherwise is to operate 
under some fundamental misconception about religion or truth or both. In 
defending apologetics, Griffiths hopes to put religious pluralism on a footing 
that is supportive of normative inquiry. 
Rhetorically Griffiths presents himself as an advocate of the traditional 
discipline of apologetics, or the philosophical art of religious advocacy. 
Apologetics can be pursued modestly, as when it is limited to a critique of 
criticisms (negative apologetics), or more ambitiously, as when it becomes a 
defense of a tradition's cognitive superiority over its competitors (positive 
apologetics). The practice of negative apologetics has enjoyed a renewed 
respectability in the wake of "Reformed epistemology," but positive apolo-
getics is still considered bad manners (or worse) in our era of increasing 
sensitivity to religious and cultural diversity. Griffiths intends to rehabilitate 
positive apologetics, not as a form of systematic philosophical inquiry into 
religious truth, but as a legitimate ad hoc response to disagreement in inter-
religious dialogue. His means to this end is to elaborate and defend what he 
refers to as "the principle of the necessity of interreligious apologetics" or 
the NOlA principle for short. It reads as follows (p. 3): 
If representative intellectuals belonging to some specific religious commu-
nity come to judge at a particular time that some or all of their own doctrine-
expressing sentences are incompatible with some alien religious claim(s), 
then they should feel obliged to engage in both positive and negative apolo-
getics vis-a-vis these alien religious c1aim(s) and their promulgators. 
Put a little less formally, if you are a participant in the intellectual life of 
your religious community, and you discover that another community's way 
of looking at the world differs significantly from your own, sometimes your 
most intellectually respectable course of action is to make the case that they 
are wrong and that you and your community are right. 
Griffiths hopes his NOlA principle will find favor with his intended audi-
ence of literate nonspecialists, folks who are concerned with what implica-
tions diversity of belief might have for the rationality of religious 
commitment but who aren't likely to be familiar with what theologians, social 
scientists, and philosophers have made of religious pluralism. The specialists 
have shaped the orthodox consensus Griffiths contends against, and he de-
scribes it for his readers by setting out hypothetical strategies (he calls them 
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"abstract possibilities"), which more or less comprise the methods scholars 
have used to explain away the appearance of interreligious disagreement. 
Conceptual relativists interpret truth as truth-relative-to-a-scheme, and con-
sequently they deny that criteria of assessment ever carry across cultural and 
religious divides. That leaves different faiths conceptually quarantined, with 
no one faith being able to affect (or infect) the way another understands the 
world. Experiential expressivists suppose that different religious conceptual 
schemes all have their impetus in a common religious experience. The expe-
rience bridges cultures, but description of the experience does not. Religious 
pluralism is therefore inevitable, but conflict at the level of doctrines will 
always be verbal, never substantive, for all doctrines have the same referent. 
Rule theorists take different religious conceptual schemes to prescribe and 
facilitate different forms of religious practice and experience. Whereas the 
expressivist takes doctrine to express experience, the rule theorist takes doc-
trine to regulate it. Rule theorists expect different doctrines to constitute 
substantially different forms of life, and so like conceptual relativists, they 
restrict truth to a scheme, only they put their emphasis on schemes of practice 
rather than on schemes of understanding. Griffiths adds perspecti vists to these 
other strategists, but as far as I can tell perspectivists are conceptual relativists 
who believe that all the religious schemes taken together somehow manage 
to represent the truth. But, of course, since different schemes are incommen-
surable, partial truth is the best anyone can hope to comprehend. 
I dare say that most of us would in our theoretical innocence tend to assume 
that interreligious disagreement is sometimes precisely what it seems to be-
genuine disagreement. There is a certain empirical implausibility to the dif-
ferent theories of religion that Griffiths surveys, at least insofar as each makes 
too little of disagreement, but he chooses to critique them less as descriptions 
of religion than as normative ideals. This is a shrewd move. If there is an 
academic consensus against taking the measure of one religion against an-
other (and I think that there is), it is a consensus influenced as much as by 
the history of apologetics as by scholarly interest in accurate description. The 
historical legacy of apologetics has left most scholars of religion convinced 
that the partiality of apologetics undermines the serious investigation of re-
ligious diversity. Their conviction is not hard to understand. Those who have 
ranked religions have not historically been those who have cared much about 
the vitality, integrity, and inherent interest of the "inferior" religions and their 
host cultures. Christian apologists in particular have suffered in reputation 
from the company they have kept. It is hard now to hear talk of Christian 
superiority without also hearing an echo of Western triumphalism. If scholars 
of religion avoid evaluative language, that is at least in part because doing 
without it dampens the impulse to devalue another culture's religious life 
relative to one's own. Neutrality comes to take the place of advocacy, and in 
the eyes of the neutral observer, all religions are created equal. 
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Griffiths is no enemy of religious pluralism, being himself a philosopher 
of religions, but he disputes the consensus under which pluralism is em-
braced. His colleagues, he contends, have treated a contingent connection 
between a willingness to argue and a will to dominate as if it were a logical 
one. It doesn't follow from the fact that positive apologetics has sometimes 
served the cause of oppression that it must always do so. Griffiths is surely 
right, but so what? Let's just admit that the academic consensus against the 
propriety of comparative religious evaluation has been formed in the hope of 
broadening the scope of religious inquiry and of facilitating interreligious 
understanding at a particular historical juncture. No one needs to claim that 
comparative evaluations are always useless given the nature of religion or 
truth, but only that they haven't been very useful given the course of history, 
and that at present we have little reason to believe they will be more useful 
in the future. If interreligious understanding can advance without recourse to 
positive apologetics, then the contingent association between positive apolo-
getics and religious intolerance is damning enough. 
But Griffiths would balk at so blithe an avoidance of apologetics. The 
NOlA principle he defends is a hypothetical imperative, and when its ante-
cedent conditions are fulfilled, negative and positive apologetics are pre-
scribed, not merely permitted. I don't want to quibble over whether the 
antecedent conditions are ever fulfilled. It seems to me that they often are. 
The more vexing question concerns the force of the imperative. Why should 
we ever under any circumstances feel obliged to do what NOlA prescribes? 
Griffiths commends us to our sense of intellectual obligation or epistemic 
duty, but either I have no epistemic conscience at all, or what he appeals to 
doesn't amount to much. If I want to uphold the cognitive superiority of my 
community's religious teachings, then I generally have to assume two kinds 
of argumentative burden. I must endeavor to undermine the beliefs of my 
community's competitors, and I must endeavor to secure the plausibility of 
my own community's point of view. I cannot fathom at all how I could be 
epistemically obliged to attempt the first task, and as far as the second task 
goes, Griffith would have me secure this plausibility without having to appeal 
to any assumptions my competitors would not accept. That's good advice if 
I want to try to win them over to my side, but why am I obliged to try to win 
them over? To save their souls? In a university community that would make 
me about as welcome as a snake-oil salesman. Saving souls is not, moreover, 
an epistemic duty. If I do have some sort of epistemic duty to win them over, 
then, Griffith suggests, it will be derived from the basic axiom, "Every human 
being is placed under the epistemic obligation to avoid knowing assent to 
false propositions" (p. 68). That is going to be some derivation. The axiom 
itself doesn't even make sense, except as an injunction not to lie. 
I admit that I am skeptical of the very idea of an epistemic obligation, and 
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if Griffiths fails to clarify this idea (as I believe he does), his singular con-
tribution to our understanding of religious pluralism and its implications 
stands nevertheless. I doubt whether the academic study of religion could 
have freed itself from parochialism without first having had the benefit of 
the "orthodoxy" Griffiths seeks to dismantle. Still, one has to wonder with 
Griffiths whether methodological guarantees of a community's religious in-
tegrity continue to serve the cause of religious inquiry. Students of religion 
are overly enamored of what Davidson referred to as the third dogma of 
empiricism, or the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content. Giv-
ing up the dogma won't secure the case for positive apologetics, but it will 
weaken the distinction between interpretation and evaluation. In his advocacy 
of apologetics, Griffiths is taking us beyond the third dogma and therefore 
beyond the choice between vacuous interreligious agreement (content without 
scheme) and insulated intrareligious positing (scheme without content). What 
he leaves us with is not, however, traditional apologetics, as he sometimes 
suggests, but a new paradigm of religious inquiry. The aim of a new apolo-
getics is not to convert, or to disabuse, but to advance a common hope for 
wisdom. We have been involved in a larger and more substantive conversation 
than our methodologies have led us to imagine. 
